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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study was to assess convergent and discriminant validity of self-report measures of 
emotion reactivity and emotion regulation and examine their associations with non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI). 
Participants included 379 college students (79 % female), ages 18-25 (M = 18.62, SD = .88) at a private university. 
Participants self-administered questionnaires designed to tap emotion regulation – the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire, the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale, and the Regulation of Emotions Questionnaire  – and 
questionnaires designed to measure reactivity – the Emotion Reactivity Scale, the Affect Intensity & Reactivity 
Measure for Youth, and the Emotional Intensity Scale. We used the Inventory of Statements About Self-Injury to 
assess NSSI – 37.43% endorsed at least one lifetime incident. We computed subscale scores for all instruments and 
subjected them collectively to exploratory factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation and principal axis factoring. 
Parallel analysis and Kaiser criteria dictated the number of factors retained.  
 A two-factor solution emerged, accounting for 39.5% of overall variance. The factors did not reflect emotion 
regulation and reactivity, as expected. Instead, Factor 1 represented Negative Emotion Reactivity and Factor 2 
represented Positive Emotion Reactivity. Hierarchical linear regression supported small but significant incremental 
utility of Factor 1 measures in predicting NSSI beyond Factor 2 measures (ΔR2=.08, F (9, 345)=3.22, p<.01), but not 
vice versa.  Results suggest a lack of discriminant validity among self-report measures of emotion regulation and 
emotion reactivity. Hierarchical regression results suggest the importance of negative emotion reactivity as a 
correlate of NSSI. Implications emerge for both research and practice.   
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Introduction 
Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) refers to the intentional destruction of body tissue without the 
intent to die and is distinct from socially condoned behaviors such as tattooing or piercing (Nock, 
2010). Previously associated with the severely mentally ill, researchers and clinicians alike now 
recognize the impact of this behavior in other populations. The prevalence of the behavior, 
particularly among adolescents and young adults, is striking. In their review of studies of NSSI 
among adolescents, Jacobson and Gould (2007) estimated lifetime prevalence rates ranging from 
13.0% to 23.2% in non-clinical samples. Among college students, studies demonstrate lifetime 
prevalences of 17% to 38% (e.g., Hamza & Willoughby, 2013; Whitlock et al., 2011; Whitlock, 
Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006). Growing evidence suggests the behavior serves primarily to 
regulate affect, but important questions remain about the nature of emotional vulnerabilities that 
put one at risk of engaging in NSSI. The present study focuses on clarifying the constructs of 
emotion regulation and emotion reactivity as they relate to this destructive behavior.  
 The widespread prevalence of NSSI raises concern both due to its direct consequences and 
links to other forms of psychopathology. The behavior is associated with depressive and anxiety 
disorders (Jacobson & Gould, 2007), externalizing disorders, substance abuse (Serras, Saules, 
Cranford, & Eisenberg, 2010; Nock, Joiner, Gordon, Lloyd-Richardson, and Prinstein, 2006), 
and disordered eating (Svirko & Hawton, 2010; Serras, Saules, Cranford, & Eisenberg, 2010; 
Ross, Heath, & Toth, 2009). Several studies have identified a link between NSSI and increased 
risk of suicidality (e.g., Hamza & Willoughby, 2013, Whitlock, Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006, 
although the exact nature of and mechanisms for such a link remain unclear and may vary by 
characteristics of self-injury (Hamza & Willoughby, 2013; Hamza, Stewart, & Willoughby, 
2012; Klonsky & Olino, 2008).  
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 Affect regulation – defined by Klonsky (2007) as efforts to “alleviate acute negative affect 
or aversive affective arousal” – consistently emerges as a primary function for the behavior. In 
his 2007 review, Klonsky found that participants from 13 different clinical samples self-reported 
affect regulation as a primary motivation for the behavior. Studies among non-clinical samples 
show similar findings. For example, Whitlock et al. (2011) examined NSSI behavior and its 
functions in 11,529 college students in the United States. Among those who reported NSSI, 81% 
endorsed affect regulation as one of its functions. In another study among college students, 
“mental distress” and “coping” were the most commonly-cited motivations for engaging NSSI 
(Wilcox et al., 2012).  Lloyd-Richardson, Perrine, Dierker, and Kelley (2007) studied functions 
of NSSI among a community sample of adolescents and found that 71% of those engaging in 
moderate to severe NSSI did so to regulate negative affect.  
 Theoretical models of NSSI propose emotional vulnerabilities that increase risk of adopting 
NSSI as an affect regulation technique. In their Experiential Avoidance Model, Chapman, Gratz, 
and Brown (2006) theorize that NSSI serves as a negative reinforcement strategy, allowing 
individuals to escape from “unwanted internal experiences.” They propose that experiencing 
more intense emotional responses along with diminished capacity to regulate emotional arousal – 
along with other emotional vulnerabilities – contribute to risk for NSSI.  Similarly, Nock (2010) 
hypothesizes that increased arousal or emotion reactivity and deficits in emotion regulation 
combine to form a general vulnerability that can interact with even more proximate risk factors 
to cause NSSI among subsets of individuals. Finally, Selby, Anestis, and Joiner (2008) offer a 
general model of behavioral dysregulation in which deficits in adaptive regulation skills and 
ruminative tendencies independently mediate the relation of distress to maladaptive behaviors. (It 
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should be noted, however, that the authors discuss but do not directly test NSSI as a form of 
behavioral dysregulation in their model.)  
Significant work remains to test the nuances of each these models and their capacity to 
predict NSSI. Conceptually though, each model share an emphasis on (1) increased negative 
affect and higher intensity of this affect – what can more generally be termed emotion reactivity; 
and (2) deficits in emotion regulation, in characterizing risk factors for NSSI. These constructs 
thus represent important targets of empirical investigation. Emotion reactivity typically refers to 
characteristics of experiences emotions outlined by Davidson (1998) – threshold for response, its 
intensity, and duration. Determining a consensus definition for emotion regulation, in contrast, 
has proved challenging. Some researchers focus on the capacity for emotions to regulate 
physiology, behaviors, etc., while others emphasize ways in which individuals influence their 
emotions (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). Even among the latter group, differences emerge. For 
example, Gratz and Roemer (2004) define emotion regulation as encompassing awareness, 
understanding, and acceptance of emotions, along with capacity to control behaviors and pursue 
one’s goals when experiencing negative emotions and use situationally appropriate strategies to 
modulate one’s emotional responses. Conversely, Gross’ (1998) definition emphasizes the 
processes people use to influence what and when they have particular emotions and how they 
experience and express these.  His definition distinguishes between antecedent-focused strategies 
(before an emotion is generated) and response-focused strategies (after the emotion is generated). 
Emotion reactivity and emotion regulation may be intertwined, as Davidson (1998) notes, “rarely 
does an emotion get generated in the absence of recruiting associated regulatory processes.” 
 The literature offers several examples of the independent contributions of emotion 
regulation and emotion reactivity to NSSI risk. For example, Gratz and Roemer (2004) found 
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higher scores on a measure of deficits in emotion regulation significantly discriminated between 
college students who self-injured and those who did not. Among a sample of female 
undergraduates, such deficits significantly discriminated among those with a history of NSSI and 
those with no such history (Gratz & Roemer, 2008).  Heath, Toste, Nedecheva, and Charlebois 
(2008) also replicated this effect. Hasking, Momeni, Swannell, and Chia (2008) examined 
specific emotion regulation strategies and found a significant difference in those used by 
individuals with a history of NSSI and those who have not engaged in the behavior. Prior 
research shows that self-injurers score higher than those who do not self-injure on self-report 
measures of emotion reactivity than individuals who do not self-injure (e.g., Glenn, Blumenthal, 
Klonsky, & Hajcak, 2011; Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008) and report significantly 
more intense affect (Gratz, 2006). Physiological evidence of heightened reactivity is mixed – 
Nock and Mendes (2008) found greater skin conductivity among adolescent self-injurers 
compared to those who did not self-injure, while Glenn et al. (2011) found no difference in the 
magnitude of startle response elicited by emotional images among young adult self-injurers and 
controls.  
  Despite evidence for the importance of both emotion reactivity and regulation to NSSI, few 
studies have examined the two constructs simultaneously to assess their individual contributions 
to NSSI. Turner, Chapman, and Layden (2012) found significant associations between limited 
access to emotion regulation strategies, use of suppression, and emotional intensity and NSSI 
among those who report using the behavior for affect regulation. Their study only included 
individuals with a lifetime history of the behavior, precluding comparisons with individuals who 
have never engaged in NSSI.  Gratz and Roemer (2008) administered measures of affect 
intensity and emotion dysregulation in tandem and demonstrated significant relations to NSSI for 
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each. However, their sample was restricted to female undergraduates in a commuter university 
and may not be generalizable to other samples of young adults. Nor is it clear that their 
measurement of emotion dysregulation would necessarily correspond to measures of specific 
emotion regulation strategies. Finally, Jenkins and Schmitz (2012) examined the relation of both 
emotion dysregulation and emotion reactivity to lifetime acts of NSSI in a sample of college 
students. They showed a significant relation for direct effects of emotion dysregulation on NSSI 
but found no evidence of a significant relation for indirect effects of emotion reactivity and 
NSSI. These conclusions could be problematic, however, insofar as (1) they derive path analysis 
with fallible measures, which can introduce additional error to a model (Cole & Preacher, 2013); 
(2) they emerged after post-hoc model modifications that may have capitalized on chance, and 
(3) they resulted from a model that did not allow for the possibility of a direct path from emotion 
reactivity to increased lifetime acts of NSSI.  
 Theoretical models and clinical treatment of NSSI necessitate clear understandings of the 
interrelation of emotion regulation and emotion reactivity and the relation of each to the 
behavior.  We thus have two broad aims in the present study. First, we aim to clarify the 
convergent and discriminant validity of emotion regulation and emotion reactivity as measured 
by commonly used instruments within NSSI research. We focus exclusively on self-report 
measures due to their ubiquity and in an effort to control for variation by type of measurement 
(ie, physiological vs. self-report). Second, we aim to examine the incremental contribution of 
each construct to lifetime risk of NSSI among a sample of older adolescents and young adults.  
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
The sample consists of 379 participants recruited from the undergraduate research pool at 
a mid-sized private university. Average age of participants was 18.62 (SD = .88), and 299 
participants were women (79.1%). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (76.3%), Asian  
American (14%), and African American (9.8%). Participants self-reported race/ethnicity and 
could select multiple options. 
Participants independently completed the battery of questionnaires online. Those 
reporting elevated depressive symptoms and/or who reported they wanted help stopping self-
harm behaviors received referrals to the university psychological services and counseling center. 
All participants received research credit in exchange for their participation.   
Measures 
Emotion Regulation. We selected three measures designed to tap aspects of emotion 
regulation so that we could examine cross-measure convergence for this construct. The Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) assesses the extent to which respondents 
use cognitive reappraisal or suppression strategies to regulate emotions. The ERQ includes six 
questions regarding participants’ use of reappraisal and four for suppression. Respondents 
indicate the extent to which each statement represents them on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) Likert scale. In validation studies among undergraduates, Cronbach’s alphas 
averaged .79 for the reappraisal scale and .73 for the suppression scale, and test-retest reliability 
for each scale was .69 (Gross & John, 2003). See Table 3 for sample items and Cronbach’s 
alphas for this and all other emotion regulation and reactivity measures used in the study.  
The Regulation of Emotions Questionnaire (REQ; Phillips & Power, 2007) consists of 19 
examples of possible emotion regulation techniques. Respondents read the stem “when I’m 
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upset” and then endorsed the frequency with which they use each technique on a 1 (not at all) to 
5 (always) scale. Factor analysis showed the REQ consists of four scales: internal-dysfunction 
regulation strategies (e.g., “I keep the feeling locked up inside”), internal-functional regulation 
strategies (e.g., “I put the situation into perspective”), external-dysfunction strategies (“I bully 
other people”), and external-functional strategies (“I ask others for advice”). Among participants 
ages 12-19, the measure showed correlations in the anticipated directions with measures of 
emotional problems and conduct issues. Phillip and Powers (2007) did not calculate test-retest 
reliability for the measure but found Cronbach’s alphas for each scales ranging from .66 to .76. 
Internal consistency in our sample was somewhat lower, as table 3 indicates.  
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS, Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36-
item questionnaire that assesses deficits in emotion regulation. The instrument was validated in a 
sample of undergraduates and produces six scales: (1) nonacceptance of emotional responses; 2) 
difficulties in engaging in goal-directed behaviors; 3) impulse control difficulties; 4) lack of 
emotional awareness; 5) limited access to emotion regulation strategies; and 6) lack of emotional 
clarity. Many of the items begin with the stem “when I’m upset…” and respondents indicate the 
extent to which a particular behavior or cognition is true for them on a 1 (almost never) to 5 
(almost always) scale. A few of the items describe adaptive responses to emotion – these are 
reverse-scored, so higher scores on any scale indicate increased difficulties. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for each scale exceeded .80, and the instrument showed excellent test-retest reliability 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004). In studies of undergraduate females, self-harmers showed significantly 
higher scores on the DERS than those who did not engage in self-harm (Gratz & Roemer, 2008). 
Emotion Reactivity. We selected three measures of emotion reactivity to establish cross-
measure convergence for this construct as well. The Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS; Nock, et 
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al., 2008) instructs the respondent to consider how they experience emotion (but does not specify 
a particular emotional state they should envision). They then rate their agreement with 21 
statements on a 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (completely like me) scale. The ERS assesses three 
areas of emotion reactivity – how readily individuals react, the intensity of their emotional 
arousal, and the duration of their emotional response. Factor analysis of the ERS indicates these 
three areas still reflect a single underlying factor of overall reactivity (Nock, et al., 2008). The 
ERS showed high internal consistency in an adolescent validation sample (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.94), and the scale has been used successfully in studies of college-age participants as well 
(Glenn et al., 2011).  
The Affect Intensity and Reactivity Measure Adapted for Youth (AIR-Y; Jones, Leen-
Feldner, Olatunji, Reardon, & Hawks, 2009) is a 40-question measure that assesses respondents’ 
perceptions of how strongly they experience positive and negative emotions. The scale was 
adapted from the Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen, 1984). The AIR-Y differs from the original 
measure only through simplified vocabulary (e.g., “really, really happy” for “euphoric”). 
Respondents rate their agreement with statements about the physical, cognitive, and affective 
components of emotion, using a 1 (never) to 6 (always) scale. Factor analysis produced a three-
factor structure for the AIM (Bryant, Yarnold, & Grimm, 1986). Scale scores are calculating by 
averaging responses that comprise the scale. The AIR-Y follows the same structure with three 
scales: Positive Affectivity (how intensely and how readily participants experience positive 
affect), Negative Reactivity (how readily participants experience negative affect), and Negative 
Intensity (how intensely participants experience negative affect). Cronbach’s alphas for these 
scales were .90, .70, and .73, respectively, in a community-based sample of adolescents (Jones et 
al., 2009). The measure showed adequate test-retest reliability. 
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The Emotional Intensity Scale (EIS; Bacharowski & Braaten, 1994) is a 30-item measure 
that assesses the intensity of emotional experiences. Respondents are asked to imagine 
themselves in 14 positive situations and 16 negative situations and select one of five responses 
that best indicates the intensity with which they would feel the emotion. It was validated in a 
sample of undergraduates and showed strong internal consistency and test-retest reliability.  
Present affect. We measured present affect using the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a commonly-used, well-
validated measure that assesses the extent to which respondents have experienced 12 positive 
and 12 negative affective states over a particular time period (the previous month, in the present 
study). Respondents endorse the extent to which they experienced each affect during the in the 
specified time period on a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The PANAS 
has high test-retest reliability and internal consistency (Watson et al., 1988). In the present 
sample, Cronbach’s alphas were .85 and .83 for the positive and negative scales.  
Depressive symptoms. We used the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, 
& Brown, 1996), a commonly used, well-validated measure designed to assess severity of 
depressive symptoms in a variety of populations. It asks respondents to rate their experience of 
21 different depressive symptoms over the past two weeks on a 0 to 3 scale. We removed the 
suicidality question on the BDI-II, leaving a remainder of 20 items. The measure has been 
independently validated in a university population and showed strong internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha=.91) and reliability (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). In the present 
sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .89.  
Non-suicidal self-injury. The Inventory of Statements About Self-Injury (ISAS; 
Klonsky & Olino, 2008) is a two-part instrument that assesses respondents’ experience with self-
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injury behaviors and reasons for engaging in those behaviors. The first section asks respondents 
to estimate the number of times they engaged in any of 12 different self-harm behaviors. 
Respondents also report the age at which they began self-harming, the amount of time that 
elapses between urges to self-harm and the behavior, and whether the individual would like to 
stop harming themselves. Klonsky and Olino validated the measure among college students who 
endorsed at least one lifetime experience with NSSI and found high internal consistency for 
Section 1 (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and strong test-retest reliability. The second section asks 
individuals to endorse reasons for engaging in the self-injurious behaviors on a 0 (not relevant) 
to 2 (very relevant) scale. It assesses 13 functions, using three questions per function (Klonsky & 
Glenn, 2009). Cronbach’s alpha for the affect regulation scale in the present sample was .81. 
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Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of participants endorsing each of the 12 self-injury types 
queried on the ISAS along with the mean and standard deviation of estimated episodes. In total, 
37.43 % of participants endorsed engaging in some form of NSSI over their lifetimes – this is 
slightly higher than previously reported college samples, but still within the range of lifetime 
prevalence reported among similar samples using the ISAS (Klonsky & Olino, 2008). Sixty-five 
percent reported harming themselves within the year preceding the study. As Table 1 shows, 
interfering with wound picking was the most frequent NSSI form endorsed, whereas more severe 
methods (e.g., carving or burning the skin) were much rarer. Table 2 shows self-reported 
functions of NSSI – affect regulation was the most highly endorsed function for the behavior in 
our sample. Affect regulation score also had the highest correlation with total NSSI. Levels of 
depressive symptoms were comparable to those reported among other college samples, based on 
the BDI-II (M = 7.92, SD = 7.19).  
Data Reduction  
 
 Previous research using the ISAS has summed estimated number of episodes across self-
injury types (Klonsky & Olino, 2008). In our sample, however, participants reported wide 
variation in number of episodes for each method, resulting in highly positively skewed 
distributions of total NSSI behavior (M = 373.96, SD = 5316.73, skewness = 18.56, SE of 
skewness = .13) Study goals included examining the incremental utility of emotion regulation 
and reactivity in statistically predicting NSSI. Accordingly, we rescaled the data in a manner to 
allow for regression analysis and preserve meaningful differences across NSSI type (see Latimer, 
Covic, & Tennant , 2012, for a hierarchical model of self-harm behaviors). Participants received 
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a “0,” “1,” or “2,” for each NSSI behavior based on whether their reported number of episodes 
for that behavior was below the 80
th
 percentile, in the 80-90
th
 percentile, or above the 90
th
 
percentile for episodes of that same behavior reported across the sample. (We selected the 80
th
 
percentile as our starting point as it most consistently captured the distinction between 
participants reporting no instances of each behavior and one or more instances of each behavior 
across the types of NSSI queried.) The rescaled scores for each NSSI behavior composed the 
participant’s total NSSI score, which we used in the regression analysis (below). Internal 
consistency for this new scale was adequate (Cronbach’s alpha = .78). The distribution of total 
NSSI behavior using this rescaling method measurably reduced data dispersion (M = 1.81, SD = 
3.30, skewness = 2.19, SE of skewness = .13). 
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Emotion Regulation and Reactivity  
 We used exploratory factor analysis to assess convergent and discriminant validity of the 
emotion regulation and emotion reactivity measures. Because some of the instruments produce 
individual subscale scores only (e.g., the ERQ), we elected to analyze each measure according to 
its published subscales. Table 4 shows the results of this exploratory factor analysis using 
principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation. Parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) and the 
Kaiser criterion supported either a two- or three-factor model (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). We 
selected the more parsimonious two-factor model, as it accounted for comparable amounts of 
variance as the more complicated model (39.50 % versus 45.45 %) while still providing 
meaningful factors.  Subscales with loadings greater than .40 are highlighted for interpretation. 
Contrary to expectation, model results supported emergence of factors based on negative 
and positive affect rather than emotion regulation and reactivity.  Factor 1 represents negative 
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emotion reactivity and dysregulation. Its largest factor loadings accrued from subscales spanning 
five different measures, suggesting strong cross-measure convergence. The DERS – Strategies 
subscale, which reflects doubt in one’s ability to regulate emotions (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), 
serves as the hallmark item of Factor 1, with a loading of .87. A second DERS subscale related 
to inability to control impulses when upset, along with two measures of emotion reactivity (the 
ERS and the AIR-Y Negative Intensity subscale) also loads strongly on this factor. The negative 
emotion subscale from the EIS and REQ Internal Dysfunction scale, and three additional DERS 
subscales (reflecting nonacceptance of emotions, inability to pursue goals while upset, and lack 
of clarity about one’s emotion experience) compose the remainder of Factor 1. Negative 
subscales converge to a unified factor and did not support discriminant validity of self-report 
emotion regulation and reactivity measures.  
Factor 2, in contrast, reflects positive emotion reactivity, along with adaptive, or 
functional, aspects of emotion regulation. Positive subscales of the EIS and AIR-Y load most 
strongly on this factor, reflecting the intensity of positive emotional responses to specific 
situations (EIS) and overall positive affectivity (AIR-Y). They are followed by the REQ External 
Functional subscale, which taps into a person’s tendency to use adaptive, externally focused 
forms of emotion regulation strategies like talking to friends when upset, and the DERS 
Awareness subscale (reverse coded, so lower scores represent higher awareness of one’s 
emotions). The ERQ Suppression subscale loads negatively on this factor, indicating less use of 
suppression aligns with increased positive reactivity. The AIR-Y Negative Intensity and 
Reactivity subscales also loaded on this factor. Table 6 shows the zero-order correlations of each 
instrument subscale, along with their correlations with total NSSI and scores on the Affect 
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Regulation scale of the ISAS-Functions measure (completed only by those with a lifetime history 
of NSSI). 
Incremental Utility of Negative Emotion Reactivity/Dysregulation and Positive Emotion 
Reactivity in Prediction of NSSI  
 
The factor analysis did not produce clear evidence for discriminant validity of emotion 
regulation and emotion reactivity as separate constructs in the selected measures. We revised our 
goals to assess the incremental utility in statistically predicting NSSI for the factors indicated by 
the EFA in statistically predicting NSSI. Table 7 shows hierarchical regression results using first 
total NSSI and then ISAS Affect Regulation scores as dependent variables. Factor 1 and Factor 2 
subscales are entered as separate steps. (See appendix for hierarchical regression results using 
emotion regulation and emotion reactivity measures, as designated by original authors, entered as 
separate steps).  
Taken together, the subscales composing Factor 1 contributed significantly to statistical 
prediction of NSSI, (ΔR2 = .08), F(9,345) = 3.22, p < 01. Of the individual subscales, only 
DERS-Strategies was significant (β = .21, t = 2.18, p = .03). The subscales composing Factor 2 
did not significantly improve the model, (R 
2
= .08), ΔF(6, 339) = .42, p = .87. Nor were any of 
the Factor 2 subscales significant individually. Reversing the step-entry order (i.e., entering the 
subscales of Factor 2 as step 1) did not change the results, as shown in table 7.  
We next conducted the hierarchical regression using the ISAS Function-Affect 
Regulation score (reflecting how much individuals who engage in NSSI do so to regulate affect) 
as the dependent variable. Again, the step consisting of Factor 1 subscales contributed 
significantly to the prediction of the Affect Regulation score, (ΔR2 = .17), ΔF(9, 122) = 2.79, p  <  
.01, but Factor 2 subscales did not, (ΔR2 = .05), ΔF(6, 116) = 1.28, p  < .01. Of the individual 
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subscales in the full model, DERS-Strategies (β = .46, t = 3.15, p < .01) and AIR-Y Negative 
Reactivity (β = .25, t = 2.19, p = .03) were significant. The DERS-Clarity subscale was 
marginally significant in the full model (β = .22, t = 2.00, p = .05) but was nonsignificant when 
Factor 1 subscales were tested alone (β = .12, t = 1.34, p = .18). 
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Discussion 
Our overarching goals were two-fold: (1) clarifying the convergent and discriminant 
validity of emotion regulation and emotion reactivity as measured by self-report instruments and 
(2) assessing the incremental utility of these constructs in predicting NSSI. Results did not 
support the convergent and discriminant validity of these measures. Instead, two factors 
characterized by emotional valence emerged. Factor 1 reflected negative emotion reactivity, on 
which measures of both negative emotion reactivity and emotion regulation deficits loaded. 
Factor 2 reflected positive emotion reactivity, on which indicators of both positive emotion 
reactivity and adaptive emotion regulation loaded. Only the first factor contributed significantly 
to the statistical prediction of NSSI. Details and implication about six specific findings appear 
below. 
First, the results suggest that self-report measures of emotion reactivity and emotion 
regulation did not demonstrate the expected discriminant and convergent validity. Instruments 
designed to measure reactivity (e.g., the ERS
1
), negative emotional intensity (e.g., the EIS-
Negative), and emotion regulation deficits (e.g., the DERS) loaded strongly onto the first factor. 
Examination of the content of the subscales comprising this factor revealed that items primarily 
reflected the tendency to experience overwhelming strong negative emotion. Items from emotion 
reactivity subscales focused on the experience of strong negative emotion (e.g., “I often get so 
upset it’s hard for me to think straight.” Items from the regulation subscales described being so 
overwhelmed by negative emotions that one could not implement emotion regulation methods or 
maintain self-control (e.g.,  “When I’m upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make 
myself feel better” and “When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors”). Also 
loading on this factor was a measure of rumination (e.g. “I dwell on my thoughts and feelings” 
— the REQ-Internal Dysfunctional subscale), assessing a maladaptive response to negative 
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emotion (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The convergence of measures designed to assess negative 
emotion reactivity, emotion regulation deficits, and maladaptive regulation techniques suggests 
that individuals may regard the inability to control one’s negative emotions (emotion 
dysregulation) and the tendency to ruminate about emotions as part of the phenomenology of a 
strong negative emotional experience, at least when evaluated by self-report measures. Previous 
scholars have remarked on similar cross-construct conflation in the coping literature. For 
example, Stanton, Danoff-Burg, Cameron, and Ellis (1994) argued certain measures of emotion-
focused coping, defined as efforts to regulate “affect surrounding a stressful experience,” are 
confounded with measures of the very affect that the coping behaviors are intended to regulate.   
We note that the current results reflect a conflation of negative emotion reactivity and 
regulation in the responses of individuals only on self-report measures. Glenn et al. (2011) noted 
the divergence of self-reported emotional reactivity from physiological measures (startle 
response). Researchers have documented similar divergence of self-report and physiological 
measures in the study of anxiety (Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2004). Neuroimaging work has 
demonstrated differential activation in social anxiety patients versus healthy controls in areas of 
the brain governing emotional response (e.g., the limbic system) and those involved in cognitive 
control (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) (Goldin, Manber, Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009). 
Activations of these systems may occur with such synchrony that individuals cannot 
phenomonologically distinguish between the experience of reactivity and regulation. Self-reports 
of strong negative reactivity may therefore reflect heightened activation of neural networks 
governing reactivity, low activation of areas controlling emotion regulation, or some 
combination of the two.    
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Second, Factor 2 represented positive emotion reactivity. Examination of the subscales 
loading onto Factor 2 revealed items assessing positive affect, high activation, and engagement. 
Representative items from these subscales included, “When I'm happy, I feel like I'm bursting 
with joy” (from the AIR-Y Positivity subscale) and “Something wonderful happens to me — I 
feel extremely joyful” (from the EIS-Positive subscale). Also loading on Factor 2 were emotion 
regulation items assessing awareness of one’s emotions, emotion suppression (which loaded in 
the negative direction), and talking to others about one’s emotions. This suggests that healthy 
emotion regulation is part of the individual’s phenomenological experience of positive 
emotional. In a similar vein, Gross and Levenson (1997) found that emotional inhibition was 
associated with low levels of self-reported positive affect. Our results echo this finding, as 
individuals who reported high emotional awareness and low levels of suppression tended to 
report increased positive reactivity as well. Again we hasten to add that these results pertain to 
self-reported positive emotional reactivity and regulation. Had other assessment methods been 
used that did not rely so heavily on self-perceptions, greater discriminant validity may have 
become evident. 
Third, we found little correlation between Factor 1 and Factor 2. This is in keeping with 
previous work documenting the orthogonality of negative and positive affect (e.g., Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985) and the conceptualization of positive and negative reactivity as reflecting 
different components of temperament (Rothbart, 1989). Similarly, our two factors would seem to 
reflect relatively orthogonal processes as well. Individuals could conceivably be high on both 
positive and negative reactivity, low on both, or high on one and low on the other.   
Our fourth finding pertains to the DERS. All DERS subscales except Lack of Awareness 
loaded onto Factor 1, reflecting ineffectual responses to negative emotions. The DERS was 
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designed in light of Gratz’s (2002) definition, which emphasizes acceptance  of emotions and the 
ability to act productively and modulate one’s responses when experiencing negative emotions.  
The inability to do these things (as measured by five of the DERS subscales) is part of a strong 
and uncontrolled negative emotional experience (possibly explaining the loadings of the DERS 
scales onto Factor 1). The discrepancy between the Lack of Awareness subscale and other DERS 
subscales has been previously reported. In their confirmatory factor analysis of the DERS, 
Bardeen, Fergus, and Orcut (2012) also noted the discrepancy between the Lack of Awareness 
subscale and other subscales of the DERS. Growing evidence about the divergence of the Lack 
of Awareness subscale strongly suggests that researchers should use caution when interpreting 
total scores from the measure. In the future, researchers might consider omitting the Lack of 
Awareness subscale altogether when summing DERS scores.  
A fifth finding pertains to the ERQ, which was designed to assess aspects of emotion 
regulation. The ERQ Suppression subscale, which assesses a regulation strategy shown to 
associate with rumination and depressive symptoms (Gross & John, 2003), loaded negatively 
onto Factor 2; however, the ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal subscale, a strategy associated with 
reduced distress and overall well-being (Gross & John, 2003) did not load onto either factor. 
Gross’ (1998) definition emphasizes the processes people use to influence what and when they 
have particular emotions and how they experience and express these.  Interestingly, our results 
do not suggest that high levels of suppression are associated with negative emotion. Instead, low 
levels of suppression were associated with positive emotion. In other words, not suppressing 
one’s emotions appears to be part of strong positive emotional experiences. Conversely, 
cognitive reappraisal was not strongly associated with either positive or negative emotional 
reactivity. Given the literature linking cognitive reappraisal with reduced distress, we interpret 
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this finding to mean that individuals perceive cognitive reappraisal as something distinct from 
their experience of the actual emotion, though reappraisal may modulate that emotion. Lack of 
converge of the ERQ-Cognitive Reappraisal scale on the current factors may indicate a third 
factor, reflecting strategy-focused emotion regulation.  
Our sixth finding pertained to the incremental utility in statistically predicting NSSI of 
Factor 1 and Factor 2. Collectively, negative emotion reactivity (Factor 1) measures predicted 
NSSI.  The DERS-Strategies subscale was primarily responsible for this relation. Previous 
studies using the DERS have consistently found the Strategies subscale to distinguish between 
those with and without histories of self-harm (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz & Roemer, 2008; 
Perez, Venta, Garnaat, & Sharp, 2012). Our results provide additional evidence that the inability 
to implement concrete strategies to down-regulate negative emotions has special relevance to 
NSSI.  
Conversely, we did not find a significant relation between positive emotion reactivity 
(Factor 2) measures and NSSI. This result extends Claes, Klonsky, Muehlenkamp, Kuppens, and 
Vandereycken’s (2010) study in which positive reactivity following NSSI correlated with 
increased NSSI among eating disorder patients. We speculate that positive reactivity must be 
experienced in connection with previous NSSI behaviors (rather than more generally) in order to 
influence the likelihood of engaging in NSSI. 
To further clarify the relations of Factor 1 and Factor 2 to NSSI when the behavior is 
used as a regulatory technique, we examined the factors’ relation to respondents’ reports about 
their use of NSSI to regulate emotion. Factor 1 but not Factor 2 contributed to statistical 
prediction of NSSI-related affect regulation. Results supported most of those reported by Turner, 
Chapman, and Layden (2012) with a one exception. We did not find a significant relation 
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between NSSI-related affect regulation and use of emotion suppression that was reported by 
Turner et al. One possible explanation for this is that, compared to Turner et al., our sample 
included considerably fewer individuals who endorsed cutting. Emotional suppression may relate 
differentially to different types of self-harm behavior. Additional research in a population 
specifically recruited to represent various forms of self-injury would be required to test this 
hypothesis.  
Limitations of the current study pave the way for future investigation. First, the study was 
cross-sectional, a factor that prevents the examination of truly prospective relations. An 
important direction for future research would be to administer the measures of NSSI, emotional 
reactivity, and emotional regulation in the context of longitudinal research designs.  Second, our 
sample was community-based but restricted to college students at an elite university. Results 
may not generalize to all community settings (particularly to non-student populations). 
Researchers should examine the generalizability of these findings to more diverse populations.  
Replication among clinical samples is also necessary, as the incidence of severe NSSI behaviors 
in the current study was relatively low. Third, we chose deliberately to concentrate on self-report 
measures emotional reactivity and regulation in order to focus on the individual’s experience of 
these phenomena; however, the limitations of self-report measures of emotion have been 
documented previously (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Utilization of psycho-physiological and 
neuro-cognitive methods might provide evidence of discriminant validity that is masked by the 
exclusive use of self-report methods. Finally, to avoid respondent fatigue, we did not utilize all 
possible emotional reactivity and regulation questionnaires. Future research could test the 
generalizability of these results with other excellent measures such as the Cognitive Emotion 
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Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) or the arousal measures 
developed by Derryberry and Rothbart (1988). 
 Despite these limitations, this study makes an important contribution to the 
conceptualization of emotion regulation and emotion reactivity, particularly as these constructs 
are studied in the NSSI field. Clarity in our definitions of these constructs will enhance our  
ability to develop theory regarding cognitive and emotional vulnerabilities to this behavior. The 
results also suggest treatment and clinical research implications. Strong negative reactivity, 
particularly the inability to access strategies to reduce one’s negative emotion consistently 
emerged as an important predictor of the behavior. Clinicians treating patients with NSSI should 
make emotion regulation skills and strategies for distress tolerance a central part of therapy 
(components of dialectical behavior therapy). Building the patient’s perceived capacity to use 
other, more adaptive skills in moments of distress may be crucial to reducing the behavior. We 
did not see significant relations between use of specific strategies (e.g., cognitive reappraisal, 
emotion suppression) and NSSI. An important line of clinical research will be focusing on what, 
if any, strategies besides NSSI do self-injurers also use to modulate their emotions.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 – We note that the ERS – one of the hallmark instruments on the negative emotion reactivity 
factor – does not explicitly instruct respondents to interpret “being ‘emotional’” as negative. Our 
participants overwhelmingly interpreted the prompt in this fashion, as indicated by the measure’s 
correspondence with the negative intensity subscales of the EIS and the AIR-Y. 
2 – We were surprised to see the AIR-Y Negative Reactivity measure loaded onto Factor 2. 
Closer examination of the subscale items shows that many of them relate to capacity for empathy 
(eg, “Sad movies deeply touch me” and “The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me 
strongly”). Bryant, Yarnold, and Grimm (1996) found a strong correlation between the Negative 
Reactivity of the AIM (parent measure of the AIR-Y) and a measure of empathetic concern – 
further evidence to support our interpretation. Individuals with high levels of positive emotion 
reactivity may also demonstrate stronger empathetic responses, though additional research would 
be necessary to confirm this. 
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Table 1 
Lifetime prevalence and frequency of NSSI behaviors 
NSSI Behavior (n) 
% Sample Endorsing 
Behavior  
Original metric 
M (SD) 
Rescaled metric 
M (SD)  
Cutting (n=360) 7.78 3.05 (37.13) .16 (.54) 
Severe scratching (n=359) 11.42 2.55 (27.16) .23 (.64) 
Biting (n=360) 6.94 1.72 (13.44) .14 (.51) 
Banging or hitting self 
(n=361) 
13.57 1.80 (8.71) .24 (.62) 
Burning (n=359) 2.23 .48 (7.94) .04 (.30) 
Interfering with wound 
healing (n=357) 
27.73 326.14 (5298.22) .35 (.69) 
Carving (n=357) 0.56 .14 (2.64) .01 (.15) 
Rubbing skin against 
rough surface (n=359) 
4.74 3.33 (53.04) .09 (.43) 
Pinching 15.24 6.54 (37.27) .28 (.68) 
Sticking self with needles 
(n=359) 
2.23 .11 (.96) .04 (.30) 
Pulling hair (n=360) 11.94 30.39 (527.05) .22 (.61) 
Swallowing dangerous 
substances (n=347) 
 
3.34 .17 (1.21) .07 (.36) 
Note. Response rates vary by question 
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Table 2  
Self-reported function of NSSI  
Function (n)
1
 M (SD) 
Correlation with rescaled total 
NSSI score 
Affect regulation (134) 2.34 (2.05) .44** 
Self-punishment (131) 1.68 (2.03) .27** 
Self-care (134) .51 (.96)                       .13 
Anti-dissociation (134)   .84 (1.52) .28** 
Anti-suicide (132)   .69 (1.54) .41** 
Interpersonal boundaries (133)   .50 (1.17)                       .20* 
Sensation seeking (132) .40 (.96)                       .19* 
Peer bonding (133) .26 (.88)                       .07 
Interpersonal influence (134)   .57 (1.13)                       .14 
Toughness (132)   .57 (1.12) .24** 
Marking distress (133) 1.13 (1.56) .23** 
Revenge (133) .34 (.98)                       .15 
Autonomy (134) .31 (.84)                       .11 
Note. Response rates vary by question, answered only by participants endorsing lifetime history of NSSI 
*p < .05; **p < .01  
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Table 3 
 Instrument subscale sample item, descriptive statistics and reliability  
Instrument subscale Sample item M (SD) 
Reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha) 
ERS 
I tend to get very emotional 
very easily. 
 
30.03 (14.42) .92 
AIR Y – Negative 
Intensity 
My feelings tend to be 
stronger compared to most 
people. 
 
3.32 (.75) .62 
AIR Y – Negative 
Reactivity 
Sad movies deeply touch me. 
 4.00 (.78) .62 
AIR Y – Positivity 
When I'm happy, I feel like 
I'm bursting with joy. 
3.78 (.69) .89 
EIS – Positive 
Something wonderful 
happens to me. I feel 
extremely joyful. 
50.41 (5.72) .82 
EIS – Negative 
People do things to annoy 
me. I feel like hitting them. 
52.94 (7.32) .82 
ERQ Cognitive 
Reappraisal 
When I want to feel less 
negative emotion, I change 
the way I’m thinking about a 
situation. 
30.21 (6.23) .83 
ERQ Suppression 
I keep my emotions to 
myself. 
14.67 (5.72) .83 
REQ Internal 
Dysfunctional 
I dwell on my thoughts and 
feelings (eg, it goes round 
and round). 
 
11.02 (3.10) .63 
REQ Internal Functional 
I review (rethink) my 
thoughts or plans. 
 
17.48 (3.12) .63 
REQ External 
Dysfunctional 
I take my feelings out on 
others physically (eg, 
fighting, lashing out). 
 
7.92 (2.69) .65 
REQ External 
Functional 
I talk to someone about how I 
feel. 
 
13.44 (2.96) .54 
DERS – Impulse 
When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty controlling my 
behaviors. 
 
10.82 (4.05) .84 
DERS – Strategies 
When I’m upset, I believe 
that I’ll end up feeling very 
depressed. 
 
18.12 (6.68) .90 
DERS – Goals 
When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty focusing on other 
things. 
 
15.96 (4.87) .91 
DERS – Awareness 
I pay attention to my feelings. 
(reverse) 
14.09 (4.05) .76 
DERS – Clarity 
I have difficulty making 
sense out of my feelings. 
11.35 (3.68) .85 
DERS - Nonacceptance 
When I’m upset, I feel 
ashamed of myself for feeling 
that way. 
 
13.74 (5.91) .92 
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Note. ERS=Emotion Reactivity Scale; AIR-Y=Affect Intensity and Reactivity Measure for 
Youth; EIS=Emotional Intensity Scale; ERQ=Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; 
REQ=Regulation of Emotions Questionnaire; DERS=Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
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Table 4 
Factor loadings by instrument subscale 
Instrument subscale Factor 1  Factor 2  
DERS – Strategies    .87 -.13 
ERS .78 .22 
AIR Y – Negative Intensity .71 .49 
DERS – Impulse  .70 -.05 
DERS – Nonacceptance  .65 -.09 
DERS – Goals   .64 -.09 
REQ – Internal Dysfunctional .64 -.13 
EIS – Negative .60 .39 
DERS – Clarity .47 -.30 
EIS – Positive .14 .64 
AIR Y – Positivity .14 .58 
REQ – External Functional -.10 .56 
DERS – Awareness  .22                      -.52 
ERQ – Suppression  .16 -.47 
AIR Y – Negative Reactivity  .33 .45 
REQ – External Dysfunctional .33 -.05 
ERQ – Cognitive Reappraisal -.30 .28 
REQ – Internal Functional -.28 .29 
 
Note. Items loading onto each factor are bolded. ERS=Emotion Reactivity Scale; AIR-Y=Affect 
Intensity and Reactivity Measure for Youth; EIS=Emotional Intensity Scale; ERQ=Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire; DERS=Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; REQ=Regulation of 
Emotions Questionnaire  
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Table 5 
Pearson correlations for instruments with NSSI, Affect Regulation 
 
Instrument 
Total NSSI  
(n=358) 
Affect 
Regulation 
(n=134) 
ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal -.04 -.10 
ERQ Suppression  .01 .08 
DERS-Nonacceptance .16** .20* 
DERS-Impulse .15** .20* 
DERS-Strategies .24** .37** 
DERS-Clarity .03 .20* 
DERS-Awareness -.01 .02 
DERS-Goals .17** .10 
REQ Internal Functional -.10 -.13 
REQ External Dysfunctional .04 -.10 
REQ External Functional -.04 -.13 
REQ Internal Dysfunctional .20** .19* 
EIS Positive .01 .02 
EIS Negative .12* .21* 
AIR-Y Positivity -.03 .03 
AIR-Y Negative Intensity .07 .23* 
AIR-Y Negative Reactivity  .04 .21* 
Emotion Reactivity Scale .16** .27** 
Beck Depression Inventory-II .14** .24** 
PANAS Positive -.12* -.04 
PANAS Negative .08 .09 
Note. ERQ=Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; DERS=Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; REQ=Regulation 
of Emotions Questionnaire; EIS=Emotional Intensity Scale; AIR Y=Affect Intensity and Reactivity Measure for 
Youth; PANAS=Positive and Negative Affect Scales 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 6 
Model and Change Statistics for Hierarchical Regression of Total NSSI, Affect Regulation on 
Factor 1 & Factor 2 Scales 
 Step Predictor 
Model statistics   Change statistics 
R
2
 Test p   R2 Test p 
 
Dependent variable = Total NSSI (n = 354) 
Analysis 1: Factor 1 (Negative emotion reactivity) entered before Factor 2 (Positive emotion reactivity)  
1 Factor 1
a
 .08 F(9, 345) < .01* 
    2 Factor 2
b
 .08 F(15, 339) .01* 
 
.01 F(6, 339) n.s. 
Analysis 2: Factor 2 entered before Factor 1 
1 Factor 2 .01 F(6, 348) n.s 
    2 Factor 1 .08 F(15, 339) .01* 
 
.08 F(9, 339) < .01* 
 
Dependent variable = Affect Regulation (n = 130) 
Analysis 3: Factor 1 entered in step 1 
1 Factor 1 .17 F(9, 122) .01* 
    2 Factor 2 .22 F(15, 116) .01* 
 
.05 F(6, 116) n.s. 
Analysis 4: Factor 2 entered in step 1 
1 Factor 2 .07 F(6, 125) n.s. 
    2 Factor 1 .22 F(15, 116) .01* 
 
.15 F(9, 116) .012* 
 
Note. 
a
Factor 1 subscales: ERS, AIR-Y Negative Intensity, EIS – Negative, DERS Nonacceptance, DERS Impulse, 
DERS Clarity, DERS Strategies, DERS Goals, REQ – Internal Dysfunctional 
b
Factor 2 subscales: AIR-Y Positivity, AIR-Y Negative Reactivity, EIS – Positive, ERQ – Suppression, DERS 
Awareness, REQ External Functional 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
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Appendix 
 
Table 7 shows the incremental contribution in predicting both NSSI and affect regulation 
score of measures designed to assess emotion regulation and those designed to assess emotion 
reactivity (as designated by the authors). Taken together, measures of emotion regulation but not 
measures of emotion reactivity contributed to the statistical prediction of total NSSI. Of the 
individual subscales from measures designated as emotion regulation instruments, only the 
DERS-Strategies contributed significantly to the statistical prediction of total NSSI (β = .20, t = 
2.14, p = .03.)  
We obtained similar results when examining Affect Regulation scores as the dependent 
variable. Measures of emotion reactivity collectively contributed to affect regulation only when 
entered in the model alone. Taken together, those measures designated as emotion regulation 
contribute significantly to the statistical prediction of affect regulation score regardless of when 
entered in the model. Of the individual subscales, the DERS-Strategies was significant (β = .43, t 
= 2.97, p < .01). The REQ-External Dysfunction was marginally significant, but in the negative 
direction, such that less externalizing behavior associated with increased tendency to use NSSI to 
regulate one’s affect (β = -.20, t = -2.01, p = .05).  
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Table 7 
Model and Change Statistics for Hierarchical Regression of Total NSSI and Affect Regulation 
Scores on Emotion Regulation & Emotion Reactivity Scales 
 Step  Predictor 
Model statistics   Change statistics 
R
2
 Test p   R2 Test p 
 
Dependent variable = Total NSSI (n = 352) 
Analysis 1: Regulation measures entered as step 1 
1 Regulation measures
a
  .08 F(12, 340) < .01* 
    2 Reactivity measures
b
 .09 F(18, 334) .02* 
 
.01 F(6, 334) n.s. 
Analysis 2: Reactivity measures entered as step 1  
1 Reactivity measures .03  F(6, 346) n.s. 
    2 Regulation measures .09 F(18, 334)  .02* 
 
.06 F(12, 334) .04* 
 
Dependent variable = Affect Regulation score (n = 130) 
Analysis 3: Regulation measures entered as step 1 
1 Regulation measures .22 F(12, 118) < .01* 
    2 Reactivity measures .25 F(18, 112) .01* 
 
.04 F(6, 112) n.s. 
Analysis 4: Reactivity measures entered as step 1 
1 Reactivity measures .10 F(6, 124) .03* 
    2 Regulation measures .25 F(18, 112) .01* 
 
.15 F(12, 112) .04* 
Note. 
a
Emotion regulation measures (as denoted by authors): DERS (Nonacceptance, Impulse, Clarity, Strategies, 
Goals, Awareness subscales), ERQ (Cognitive reappraisal, Suppression subscales), REQ (Internal Functional, 
Internal Dysfunctional, External Functional, External Dysfunctional subscales)  
b
Emotion reactivity and intensity measures (as defined by authors): ERS, AIR-Y (Positivity, Negative Intensity, 
Negative Reactivity subscales), EIS (Positive, Negative subscales) 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
